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AMERICAN PRIMACY
Its Prospects and Pitfalls
Stephen M. Walt
The end of the Cold War left the United States in a position of power unseensince the Roman Empire. The U.S. economy produces about 25 percent of
the world’s goods and services; it is more than twice as big as that of Japan, the
world’s number-two economic power. The United States spends more on de-
fense than the next nine countries combined, and because seven of those nine
countries are its close allies, the effective advantage is even larger. The United
States is the world leader in higher education and information technology, and
its cultural shadow—in music, cinema, television, and other arts—is enormous.
America’s position in the world is not perfect, per-
haps, but Americans could hardly ask for much more.1
This position of primacy is partly due to good fortune
and especially to having been founded on a continent
rich in resources yet far from other major powers. But
the United States is also number one because its leaders
have deliberately sought to achieve and maintain that
position. During the nineteenth century the United
States gradually expanded to become a continental
power, encouraged immigration and foreign invest-
ment, and sought to exclude other major powers from
the Western Hemisphere. As the Monroe Doctrine and
the concept of Manifest Destiny symbolized, the guiding
star of U.S. foreign policy was the goal of making the na-
tion a hegemon in its own neighborhood.2
After becoming a great power at the beginning of
the twentieth century, however, the United States also
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sought to prevent other states from establishing similar positions of hegemony
in their own regions. The logic of this policy was straightforward—so long as
neither Europe nor Asia was dominated by a single power, states in both regions
would be obliged to worry primarily about each other and would be unable to
focus their attention on the United States. Thus, the United States intervened in
Europe in World Wars I and II in order to prevent Germany from establishing
hegemony there and fought in the Pacific theater to prevent Japan from domi-
nating that region as well. During the Cold War, of course, the United States ex-
plicitly sought to remain the world’s strongest power in both the military and
economic realms. As the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff argued in
1947, “To seek less than preponderant power would be to opt for defeat. Prepon-
derant power must be the object of U.S. policy.”3
Given this long-standing ambition, it is ironic that the U.S. victory in the
Cold War and the growing awareness of its remarkable global position has pro-
duced a debate on the desirability of primacy and on its implications for Ameri-
can foreign policy. For some writers, such as Robert Jervis, the value of
“primacy” is diminished in an era where nuclear weapons limit the ability of
great powers to threaten each other and when relations among the major powers
are regulated by norms, institutions, and a spirit of democratic compromise.4
For others, such as Samuel P. Huntington, primacy remains an invaluable re-
source, and preserving it “is central to the welfare and security of America and
the future of freedom.”5 American military planners continue to craft policies
designed to sustain a considerable advantage, and one would be hard pressed to
find a prominent U.S. politician who would openly endorse anything less than
the continuation of the nation’s dominance. If the United States is now a
“hyperpower,” to use French foreign minister Hubert Verdrine’s evocative term,
its present policy seems designed to maintain that position as long as possible.
Given that the United States cannot alter its current position—at least not in
the short term—we need to understand both the positive ends that primacy can
offer and the pitfalls that it may present.
Accordingly, the first part of this article outlines the main benefits that U.S.
primacy now brings. I argue that primacy increases the nation’s security, fosters
a more stable and prosperous world, and gives the United States far more influ-
ence over global events than any other state possesses. Given these features, it is
hardly surprising that there is a strong bipartisan consensus for maintaining
America’s privileged position. The second part of this article examines some of
the ways that primacy complicates the making of U.S. foreign policy. Being
number one is an enviable thing, but it also creates special challenges that are
often overlooked or misunderstood. The conclusion describes how the United
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States can best use its power to advance specific foreign policy goals and avoid
some of the pitfalls of its present position.
WHAT IS PRIMACY GOOD FOR?
The first thing to understand about U.S. primacy is that it is not new. Although
the end of the Cold War highlighted America’s unprecedented concentration of
economic and military power, the United States has had the world’s largest econ-
omy for over a hundred years and the greatest military potential for most of that
time as well.6 Despite alarmist concerns about the Soviet military during the
Cold War, U.S. strength exceeded that of the Soviet Union for most (if not all) of
that period. Soviet military capabilities were a match for American forces only in
Europe, and the capacity of the USSR to project power globally was always dis-
tinctly inferior to the naval, air, and amphibious capabilities of the United States.
Americans, in short, are used to being number one. Those who believe that
primacy does not really matter fail to appreciate how accustomed Americans are
to having it; they might miss it, as they would oxygen, if it were gone. Why?
Because primacy provides at least four major benefits.
Primacy Provides Security
Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United
States benefits from its current position—is that international politics is a dan-
gerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guaran-
tee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all
outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm
than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that
arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so
wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the
future.
At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United
States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable dem-
ocratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international eco-
nomic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in
Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion. When the strategic
importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States cre-
ated its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil sup-
plies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the
United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September
2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the network’s Taliban hosts and to compel
broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It
W A L T 1 1
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would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had
been weaker.
Today, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in
virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite
the “focused enmity” of the United States (to use William Wohlforth’s apt
phrase), and countries and groups that have done so (such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia,
or the Taliban) have paid a considerable price. As discussed below, U.S. domi-
nance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but anti-American ele-
ments are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies (such as terrorist
bombings) that do not seriously threaten America’s dominant position. Were
American power to decline significantly, however, groups opposed to U.S. inter-
ests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely.
This does not mean that the United States can act with impunity, nor does it
guarantee that the United States will achieve every one of its major foreign pol-
icy objectives. It does mean that the United States has a margin of security that
weaker states do not possess. This margin of safety is a luxury, perhaps, but it is
also a luxury that few Americans would want to live without.
Primacy Provides Tranquility
A second consequence of U.S. primacy is a decreased danger of great-power
rivalry and a higher level of overall international tranquility. Ironically, those
who argue that primacy is no longer important, because the danger of war is
slight, overlook the fact that the extent of American primacy is one of the main
reasons why the risk of great-power war is as low as it is.
For most of the past four centuries, relations among the major powers have
been intensely competitive, often punctuated by major wars and occasionally by
all-out struggles for hegemony. In the first half of the twentieth century, for ex-
ample, great-power wars killed over eighty million people. Today, however, the
dominant position of the United States places significant limits on the possibil-
ity of great-power competition, for at least two reasons.
One reason is that because the United States is currently so far ahead, other
major powers are not inclined to challenge its dominant position. Not only is
there no possibility of a “hegemonic war” (because there is no potential
hegemon to mount a challenge), but the risk of war via miscalculation is re-
duced by the overwhelming gap between the United States and the other major
powers. Miscalculation is more likely to lead to war when the balance of power is
fairly even, because in this situation both sides can convince themselves that
they might be able to win. When the balance of power is heavily skewed, how-
ever, the leading state does not need to go to war and weaker states dare not try.8
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The second reason is that the continued deployment of roughly two hundred
thousand troops in Europe and in Asia provides a further barrier to conflict in
each region. So long as U.S. troops
are committed abroad, regional
powers know that launching a war
is likely to lead to a confrontation
with the United States. Thus,
states within these regions do not
worry as much about each other, because the U.S. presence effectively prevents
regional conflicts from breaking out. What Joseph Joffe has termed the “Ameri-
can pacifier” is not the only barrier to conflict in Europe and Asia, but it is an im-
portant one. This tranquilizing effect is not lost on America’s allies in Europe
and Asia. They resent U.S. dominance and dislike playing host to American
troops, but they also do not want “Uncle Sam” to leave.9
Thus, U.S. primacy is of benefit to the United States, and to other countries as
well, because it dampens the overall level of international insecurity. World
politics might be more interesting if the United States were weaker and if other
states were forced to compete with each other more actively, but a more exciting
world is not necessarily a better one. A comparatively boring era may provide
few opportunities for genuine heroism, but it is probably a good deal more
pleasant to live in than “interesting” decades like the 1930s or 1940s.
Primacy Fosters Prosperity
By facilitating the development of a more open and liberal world economy,
American primacy also fosters global prosperity. Economic interdependence is
often said to be a cause of world peace, but it is more accurate to say that peace
encourages interdependence—by making it easier for states to accept the poten-
tial vulnerabilities of extensive international intercourse.10 Investors are more
willing to send money abroad when the danger of war is remote, and states
worry less about being dependent on others when they are not concerned that
these connections might be severed. When states are relatively secure, they will
also be less fixated on how the gains from cooperation are distributed. In partic-
ular, they are less likely to worry that extensive cooperation will benefit others
more and thereby place them at a relative disadvantage over time.11
By providing a tranquil international environment, in short, U.S. primacy has
created political conditions that are conducive to expanding global trade and in-
vestment. Indeed, American primacy was a prerequisite for the creation and
gradual expansion of the European Union, which is often touted as a triumph of
economic self-interest over historical rivalries. Because the United States was
there to protect the Europeans from the Soviet Union and from each other, they
W A L T 1 3
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could safely ignore the balance of power within Western Europe and concentrate
on expanding their overall level of economic integration. The expansion of
world trade has been a major source of increased global prosperity, and U.S. pri-
macy is one of the central pillars upon which that system rests.12 The United
States also played a leading role in establishing the various institutions that reg-
ulate and manage the world economy. As a number of commentators have
noted, the current era of “globalization” is itself partly an artifact of American
power. As Thomas Friedman puts it, “Without America on duty, there will be no
America Online.”13
Primacy Maximizes Influence
Finally, primacy gives the United States greater freedom of action and greater in-
fluence over the entire agenda of global issues. Because it is less dependent on
other countries, the United States is to a large extent able to set the terms for its
participation in many international arrangements. Although cooperating with
others is often in its interest, the option to “go it alone” gives the United States
greater bargaining power than most (if not all) other states.14 The United States
can also choose to stay out of trouble if it wishes; because it is objectively very se-
cure, it can remain aloof from many of the world’s problems even when it might
be able to play a constructive role.15
Yet primacy also means that the United States can undertake tasks that no
other state would even contemplate and can do so with reasonable hope of suc-
cess. In the past decade, for instance, the United States played a key role in guid-
ing the reunification of Germany; negotiated a deal to end North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program; and convinced Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to give up
the nuclear arsenals they had inherited from the Soviet Union. It also rescued the
Mexican economy during the peso crisis in 1994, brought three new members
into the Nato alliance, defeated and defanged Iraq in 1991, and kept the Iraqi
regime under tight constraints thereafter. The United States also played an im-
portant role in the recovery from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, led the coali-
tion that defeated Serbia in the 1999 war in Kosovo, and used its economic
power to encourage the ouster of Slobodan Milosevic and his prosecution for
alleged war crimes. U.S. power probably helped prevent any number of events
that might have occurred but at this writing have not—such as a direct Chinese
challenge to Taiwan or a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Each of
these achievements required resources, and America’s capacity to shape world
events would be much smaller were its relative power to decline.
In short, saying that Americans like a position of primacy is akin to saying
that they like power, and they prefer to have more of it rather than less. It may
not be politically correct to talk about “enjoying” the exercise of power, but most
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people understand that it is better to have it than to lack it. Having a great deal of
power may not guarantee success or safety, but it certainly improves the odds.
One imagines, for example, that Senator Tom Daschle likes being majority
leader of the U.S. Senate more than he liked being minority leader, just as one
suspects that Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin, and now Vladimir Putin would
have acted quite differently had Russian (or Soviet) power not deteriorated so
dramatically. The reason is simple—when one is stronger, one can defend one’s
interests more effectively and can more easily prevent others from imposing
their will.16 Power also gives people (or states) the capacity to pursue positive
ends, and a position of primacy maximizes one’s ability to do so.
Thus, anyone who thinks that the United States should try to discourage the
spread of weapons of mass destruction, promote human rights, advance the
cause of democracy, or pursue any other positive political goal should recognize
that the nation’s ability to do so rests primarily upon its power. The United
States would accomplish far less if it were weaker, and it would discover that
other states were setting the agenda of world politics if its own power were to de-
cline. As Harry Truman put it over fifty years ago, “Peace must be built upon
power, as well as upon good will and good deeds.”17
The bottom line is clear. Even in a world with nuclear weapons, extensive
economic ties, rapid communications, an increasingly vocal chorus of
nongovernmental organizations, and other such novel features, power still mat-
ters, and primacy is still preferable. People running for president do not declare
that their main goal as commander in chief would be to move the United States
into the number-two position. They understand, as do most Americans, that
being number one is a luxury they should try very hard to keep.
WHY BEING NUMBER ONE IS HARDER THAN IT LOOKS
Being number one is desirable, then, but it is not an unalloyed good for the in-
cumbent. America’s current position of preponderance also creates a number of
significant problems for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, problems that make
it harder to use American power and more difficult to obtain the precise out-
comes that the nation seeks.18 What are these pitfalls, and how do they affect the
ability of the United States to get what it wants?
Declining Public Support
The first problem created by America’s favorable global position is a loss of pub-
lic support for an active and engaged foreign policy. When asked, Americans still
favor “engagement” over “isolationism,” but public interest in foreign issues is
declining, and support for a costly foreign policy is especially weak. In a 1998 poll
by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, for example, when Americans
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were asked to name two or three important problems facing the nation, foreign
policy issues did not make the top seven; they constituted only 7.3 percent of all
issues mentioned. When asked to name “two or three foreign policy problems
facing the nation,” the most common response (at 20 percent) was “Don’t
know.” Support for traditional
U.S. allies has also declined signif-
icantly.19 Thus, the United States
withdrew from Somalia after
eighteen soldiers were lost, stayed
out of Rwanda completely, was
visibly reluctant to send ground
troops to Bosnia or Kosovo, and fought the air war in Kosovo from fifteen thou-
sand feet. Public support for key international institutions has also declined, and
foreign policy issues played at most a minor role in the 2000 presidential cam-
paign. It is also worth noting that a key element of President George W. Bush’s
campaign platform was the need for the United States to be more “selective” in
its overseas commitments. This is a far cry from the call to “pay any price and
bear any burden” that animated U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.
To be sure, there has been a surge of public interest and support in the wake of
the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent war against Al-Qaeda and
the Taliban. Yet even here, the United States has relied heavily on proxy forces
and remains ambivalent about taking on a long-term security role in Central
Asia. Unless Al-Qaeda proves more resilient than it now appears, public atten-
tion is certain to wane over time. As it does, U.S. leaders will once again find
themselves having to weigh their international ambitions against a rather mod-
est level of popular interest and backing.
These shifts are not simply a function of partisan politics or of former presi-
dent William Clinton’s delicate relationship with the U.S. military. Rather, they
are a direct consequence of America’s remarkably favorable world position. Be-
cause America is in such good shape, most Americans tend to ignore interna-
tional politics and to focus their attention on other problems. The point is not
that Americans are unwilling to run risks or bear costs; it is that they are reluc-
tant to do so for the kinds of interests that are now at stake. This tendency will
discourage any U.S. president from pursuing an activist foreign policy, because
public support for it will be thin. Paradoxically, the very strength of America’s
present position reduces public support for using that power in costly or risky
ways, except in those (one hopes rare) moments when the United States is
attacked directly. Indeed, this policy may even make sense—when the world
is already one’s oyster, there is not much more to gain.20
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Hubris Can Hurt
A second pitfall is the opposite of the first—when a nation is as strong as the
United States, there is a tendency for its leaders to assume that they can do al-
most anything. Public support for an ambitious foreign policy may be thin, but
U.S. leaders may ignore that fact if they believe they can accomplish a great deal
at a relatively low cost. They may also find it difficult to avoid being dragged into
various quagmires and responsibilities in many parts of the world, because
America’s present margin of superiority makes it harder to draw the line against
further commitments. As the late Senator Richard Russell once warned, “If
America has the capacity to go anywhere and do anything, we will always be go-
ing somewhere and doing something.”
Consider the past decade. In addition to the various achievements discussed
above, the United States tried to broker a final Arab-Israeli peace settlement,
re-create a stable multiethnic democracy in Bosnia in the wake of a bloody civil
war, and stabilize the entire Balkan region in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo.
The United States also provided logistic support for peacekeeping efforts in East
Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone; attempted to cement Western influence in
the Black Sea and Caspian regions; and tried to get India and Pakistan to refrain
from testing nuclear weapons. At the same time, it also committed itself to
building a national missile defense system in the face of foreign opposition and
enormous technical obstacles. American leaders have also worked to liberalize
the world economy, establish a constructive relationship with a rising China,
and achieve a workable agreement to combat global warming.
Now consider what the campaign against terrorism has added to America’s
overloaded foreign policy agenda. To support its military operations in Afghani-
stan (and possibly elsewhere), the United States has taken on new security obli-
gations in Pakistan and Uzbekistan. To keep the coalition together and rebuild
relations with the Arab world, the United States is trying to convince Israel and
the Palestinians to make additional concessions after more than a year of bloody
violence. To stabilize the Pervez Musharraf government and encourage it to
sever its ties to Islamic extremists, Washington is providing economic aid to
Pakistan and trying to reduce tensions between Pakistan and India. Having top-
pled the Taliban, the United States must now take on the challenge of nation
building in an impoverished region where it has little background or experience.
To ensure that Al-Qaeda does not reemerge somewhere else, the United States is
trying to root out terrorist cells in a host of other countries and attempting to
cut off the covert financial flows that nurture these networks. To accomplish any
one of these goals will be difficult; to achieve the entire agenda will be nearly
impossible.
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Given these ambitions, it is hardly surprising that the United States does not
accomplish everything it tries to do. The real lesson, however, is that strong
states are invariably tempted to take on extremely ambitious goals—and they
often find this temptation impossible to resist. In baseball, a batter who “swings
for the fences” may hit more home runs than others but will probably strike out
more often, too. Weaker states cannot accomplish as much as strong ones, but
they may be better at recognizing the limits of what they can realistically hope to
achieve and be less likely to overextend themselves.
There is an obvious tension between the first two pitfalls, but not a complete
contradiction. On the one hand, the fact that foreign policy simply is not very
important to most Americans (because the United States is already in very good
shape) reduces public support for ambitious foreign policies. On the other
hand, fifty years of international activism and America’s extraordinary capa-
bilities can lead its leaders to believe that they can achieve almost anything at
an acceptable cost. The danger, of course, is that Washington will establish com-
mitments and pursue goals for which there is little domestic support, only to
be blindsided by public opposition should the costs exceed the low initial
expectations.
Asymmetry of Motivation
If the United States is so powerful, why doesn’t it always get what it wants? The
reason is simple—although the United States is much stronger than most other
countries, other states often care more about the issues at stake than America
does. American leaders worry about the spread of nuclear weapons in South
Asia, for example, but their Indian and Pakistani counterparts care more about
acquiring a deterrent than the Americans care about stopping them. Similarly,
the United States and its Nato allies were vastly stronger than Milosevic’s Serbia,
but he resisted their pressure for nearly a decade, because his regime cared more
about the issues at stake than they did. The same dynamic limits U.S. influence
in the Middle East; although the United States would like to foster a lasting peace
between Israel and the Palestinians, its influence is limited, because the antago-
nists care more about the final outcome than it does.
Once again, the fact that other states are usually more motivated than the
United States with respect to their own regional issues does not reflect some fail-
ure of strategic vision, lack of leadership, or loss of will on the part of the United
States. Rather, this is a direct result of its favorable international position. Other
states care more about many issues because their fates are more intimately tied
to the results. Conflict in the Middle East does affect the United States, but
American survival is hardly at stake in the same way that it is for the Israelis, the
Palestinians, or their neighbors. If one of the great benefits of primacy is that it
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allows the United States to view many international issues in a detached fashion,
that relative disinterest means that weaker states may be willing to pay a large
price to thwart U.S. objectives.
“It’s Lonely at the Top”
A fourth pitfall follows from the familiar principle of the balance of power. In a
world of independent states, the most powerful country will always appear at
least somewhat threatening to others, who cannot be entirely sure it will use its
power wisely and well. As a result, other states usually try to find ways to keep the
power of the dominant state in check, often through formal or informal alli-
ances. This tendency will be muted if the strongest state acts in a benevolent
fashion and its goals are broadly compatible with the interests of other major
powers, but it never vanishes entirely.21
The tendency for states to “balance” the strongest power explains why France,
Russia, and China joined forces to undercut U.S. policy toward Iraq and Serbia,
and it underlies the principal motivation for the recent Sino-Russian Friendship
Treaty.22 It also explains why European states want to strengthen and deepen the
European Union, why President
Hugo Chávez of Venezuela advo-
cates global resistance to U.S. he-
gemony, and why President Putin
of Russia has expressed hope that
India will become a great power
and help re-create a “multipolar world.”23 The desire to check U.S. influence is
also evident in the recent vote ousting the United States from the United Nations
Committee on Human Rights, as well as the hostile demonstrations that rou-
tinely accompany “Group of Eight” economic summits.
Efforts to balance the United States have been modest thus far (surprisingly
so, when one considers how powerful the United States is), because the United
States is geographically isolated from the other major power centers and does
not seek to dominate any of those regions. Indeed, America’s geographic
position remains an enormous asset, because the major powers in Europe and
Asia tend to worry more about their neighbors. But the desire to keep a leash on
“Uncle Sam” is real, and U.S. leaders should not underestimate the potential for
concerted anti-American action in the future.24
The tendency for the strongest power to provoke widespread opposition is
probably the central challenge of contemporary U.S. foreign policy. The ques-
tion is, how can the United States minimize the efforts of other states to keep it in
check? U.S. policy cannot eliminate that tendency entirely, but it can almost
certainly make the problem worse if it is insensitive to others’ concerns.
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Conflicting Priorities
American primacy creates one final pitfall. As the only global superpower, the
United States is engaged in virtually every corner of the globe and in almost
every significant issue. Even when it tries to remain aloof—as it did in the Bal-
kans in the 1990s and in the Middle East in the first half of 2001—long-standing
commitments tend to drag it in. This condition also forces U.S. leaders to make
important decisions on issues where they have little background or expertise.
One need only reflect on American policy in the Balkans to realize how easy it is
for the United States to become engaged in areas and disputes in which it has
little experience or insight. By contrast, weaker states can focus their attention
on a few key issues and ignore most of the others.
To make matters worse, U.S. objectives in one region or on some particular is-
sue often conflict with its purposes elsewhere, which means that success in one
endeavor may make things worse somewhere else. For example, expanding Nato
may help defuse tensions in Europe and promote democratic development
there, but it inevitably undermines relations with Russia and complicates deci-
sion making within the alliance itself. Similarly, the United States wants to sup-
port Israel, wants to promote peace in the Middle East, and wants good relations
throughout the Arab world; these are all worthy goals, but they are difficult to
achieve simultaneously. This same problem is even more acute in the American
relationship with China. The United States wants to promote a close economic
relationship with China (both for strictly economic reasons and to encourage
Chinese moderation), but it also wants to deter China from using force against
Taiwan and to encourage Beijing to adopt more liberal human rights policies.
Moreover, Washington wants to pursue these goals without alarming its other
Asian allies, and to encourage democratic forces in China without destabilizing
the Chinese government. The problem, of course, is that pushing hard for any of
these objectives will inevitably make it more difficult to achieve others.
Once again, this conundrum is directly related to America’s position of pri-
macy. All states face trade-offs in the conduct of foreign policy, but the choices
are more numerous and more complicated for the United States, because it has
its fingers in many different problems. Lesser powers generally face fewer con-
flicts between different objectives, simply because they are not committed in as
many places and are not trying to accomplish as much.
Taken together, these pitfalls explain why even a country as powerful as the
United States cannot achieve all of its foreign policy objectives. They also iden-
tify some of the obstacles that U.S. leaders must overcome when engaging with
other countries. Thus the final question to consider is how the United States can
best exploit its remarkable advantages and minimize the constraints that its
preponderant position necessarily imposes.
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HOW TO CONDUCT A “HUMBLE” FOREIGN POLICY
In the second debate of the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush de-
clared that other states would be attracted to the United States if it were strong
but “humble”; they would be repulsed, he warned, if the nation were to use its
power in an “arrogant” fashion. His instincts were correct, although his subse-
quent behavior as president suggests he has not fully embraced his own advice.
The problem is simple. Because the United States is so strong and its influence
is so pervasive, it inevitably provokes suspicion by other states and finds it more
difficult to gain their cooperation. As discussed above, it also tends to face awk-
ward trade-offs in conducting foreign policy, and often its leaders can expect
only thin support for major initiatives. Given such constraints, how can the
United States maximize the advantages that primacy provides and avoid its
pitfalls? The analysis thus far points to several recommendations.
Maintain U.S. Capabilities
U.S. power is the main source of American international influence and the ulti-
mate guarantor of the nation’s sovereignty. It is the main reason why the support
of the United States is valued and why its opposition is feared. Increasing the
U.S. lead still further might not be worth the effort (given that the United States
is already far ahead), but allowing others to catch up would squander most of the
advantages that primacy now provides.
This means that the United States should continue to worry about the overall
distribution of world power. In addition to devoting an adequate share of na-
tional wealth to the creation of politically meaningful capabilities (including
military power, technological expertise, etc.), Washington must project how
global trends will affect the nation’s position over time. In particular, U.S. lead-
ers will eventually have to decide whether it makes sense to try to slow the
growth of certain powers and take steps to discourage the formation of even
tacit anti-American coalitions. In particular, encouraging the emergence of a
strong and wealthy China may not be in America’s long-term interest, even if
China were eventually to become more democratic.
Mailed Fist, Velvet Glove
U.S. preponderance makes other states more sensitive to the ways in which
American power is used. As a result, the United States should take care to use its
power judiciously, especially where military force is involved.
From this general point, two specific recommendations follow. The United
States should use force with forbearance. Although it will occasionally be tempt-
ing to use force preemptively so as to minimize casualties or convey resolve,
America’s preponderance allows it to take a more relaxed and deliberate view of
many international developments. States whose existence might be endangered
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should they fail to act quickly have to be ready to preempt threats and may be
forced to respond vigorously to ambiguous warnings. Because the United States
is objectively so secure, however, it can rely primarily on policies of deterrence
and retaliation rather than preemption. For example, although American offi-
cials did have genuine grounds for launching cruise-missile strikes on Afghani-
stan and Sudan in 1998, the decision to do so on the basis of the inconclusive
information then available ignored the larger geopolitical effects of appearing
overeager to use force.25 In general, Washington should follow a prescription of
Woodrow Wilson—that the United States “can afford to exercise the self-
restraint of a truly great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to
misuse it.”26
Second, the United States can reduce the threat perceived by other states in its
overawing power by giving them a degree of influence over the circumstances in
which it will use force. Confining the use of force to multilateral contexts would
be an effective way to assuage potential fears about unilateral exercise of Ameri-
can power. This point has been lost on conservative opponents of the United Na-
tions and other international institutions, who fail to recognize that multilateral
institutions help the United States exercise its power in a way that is less threat-
ening (and therefore more acceptable) to other states. Although exceptions will
arise from time to time, the United States should for the most part rely upon a
“buddy system” to regulate the large-scale use of its military power. Specifically,
if it cannot persuade one or more other major powers to join in, it should refrain
from using force.27 This policy might also increase other states’ incentives to
maintain good relations with Washington, because close ties with the United
States will give them a greater influence over how Washington chooses to use its
power.
It might be asked, does not the recent war in Afghanistan teach the opposite
lesson—that other states will respect U.S. power and rush to support the United
States provided it acts firmly and makes clear that other states have a clear
choice, either to be “with us or against us”? From this perspective, the United
States should rarely, if ever, allow allies to interfere with its decision making and
should for the most part chart its own course, confident that weaker states will
fall into line.
Such a view is obviously appealing to Americans—because it suggests they can
do pretty much what they please—and there is probably a grain of truth to it. But
it would be a mistake to interpret the degree of international support that the U.S.
received after 11 September as evidence that the United States can use force when-
ever it wants to without jeopardizing its international position. First, the United
States enjoyed enormous international sympathy after 11 September because it
was responding to an unprovoked attack on innocent civilians. If the United States
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came to be seen as the aggressor rather than the victim, however, international
support would evaporate quickly. Second, other states have supported the war on
terrorism either because they see it as a common danger that threatens all states or
because they want to seize this opportunity to advance interests of their own.
Third, it remains to be seen how long this high level of international support will
last. The United States led an equally impressive coalition in the 1990–91 Persian
Gulf War, but allied support faded once Kuwait was liberated; the loss of backing
eventually doomed U.S. efforts to enforce the UN sanctions regime.
The central lesson underlying these suggestions is that the United States
needs to think of “reassurance” as a continuous policy problem. Throughout the
Cold War, the United States did a variety of things to remind its allies that its
commitment to them remained solid—military exercises, visits by important
officials, oral pledges, and other signals of commitment—and it did them con-
stantly. Now that the Cold War is over and the United States is essentially un-
checked, its leaders have to make a similar effort to convince other states of its
good will, good judgment, and sense of restraint. American leaders cannot
simply declare those values once and then act as they please; reassuring gestures
have to be repeated, and reassuring statements have to be reiterated frequently.
The more consistent the nation’s words and deeds, the more effective such
pledges will be.
Do Not Treat Potential Adversaries as Monolithic
During the Cold War, the United States sometimes viewed all leftist or Marxist re-
gimes as indistinguishable parts of a communist “monolith.” Although some U.S.
officials held more subtle views (and developed strategies that reflected them), the
general tendency to regard any leftist or socialist regime as a potential tool of the
Kremlin often led to self-fulfilling spirals of hostility with these regimes.28
Because the United States has an important interest in discouraging other
states from joining forces against it, it should not assume that its various oppo-
nents are part of some well-organized anti-American movement. To take the
most obvious example, referring to North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya collec-
tively as anti-American “rogue states” ignores the important differences be-
tween these states, blinds the nation to the possibility of improving relations
with some of them, and encourages them to cooperate with one another even
more.29 Even worse, to label Iraq, Iran, and North Korea an “axis of evil,” as Presi-
dent Bush did in his February 2002 State of the Union speech, made it less likely
that these regimes would moderate their anti-U.S. policies; it also made key al-
lies question America’s judgment. Similarly, if U.S. leaders assume that cultural
differences will lead to an inevitable “clash of civilizations” between the West
and various non-Western states, they are likely to act in ways that will aggravate
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these differences, thereby making the prophecy self-fulfilling. Equally impor-
tant, they are more likely to miss opportunities to keep potentially hostile blocs
divided. As it is, there are significant obstacles to the formation of a strong
anti-American coalition; does the United States really want to encourage one?30
Rethink the Commitment to National Missile Defense
Despite widespread international misgivings, the Bush administration remains
strongly committed to developing missile defenses. In particular, it has an-
nounced its intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty and is accelerating
efforts to develop and deploy several forms of missile defense.
Although the Bush administration is unlikely to reverse course at this stage, it
would do well to slow down and rethink the merits of rapid development, let
alone deployment. Nuclear weapons are still the “trump cards” of international
politics, and the acquisition of a genuine “first-strike” capability could give its
possessor an extraordinary capac-
ity to coerce or destroy other
powers. The combination of large
offensive nuclear forces and an ef-
fective missile defense could give
the United States the capacity to
strike other states with impunity. At the very least, it would make it more diffi-
cult for them to deter U.S. conventional actions by threatening to escalate. Thus,
it is hardly surprising that Russia, China, and several American allies view this
initiative with misgivings. It does little good to try to assure them that the system
will be limited to a defense against accidental launches or “rogue states” because
they cannot be sure that the United States would not try to expand it later.31 For
all these reasons, other states are likely to regard a U.S. effort to build even a
“limited” national missile defense system with alarm. Although such a policy is
unlikely to trigger an anti-U.S. alliance all by itself, it would certainly make such
a development more likely.
Perhaps most importantly, supporters of national missile defense have yet to
advance a compelling strategic rationale for such a radical departure. The most
plausible justification for developing national missile defense is the desire to
ensure that weaker states (such as Iraq) are not able to negate U.S. conventional
military superiority by threatening to use a weapon of mass destruction. A small
missile-defense system might be sufficient for this purpose, because these states
are unlikely to acquire large arsenals. This means that the United States should
be able to negotiate an agreement that permits a limited deployment (sufficient
to protect against accidental launches or very small arsenals) while ensuring that
Russia, China, and other nuclear powers remain confident that their own deterrents
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are not at risk. If the United States wants to reduce other states’ incentives to bal-
ance against it, it should move slowly on missile defense and remain open to a
mutually agreeable bargain on the size of both offensive and defensive strategic
forces.
Defend the Legitimacy of U.S. Primacy
Other states will be more likely to support American initiatives (and less likely to
join forces to thwart them) if they believe American primacy is broadly benefi-
cial. If they think that U.S. power serves the interests of others as well as its own,
they may occasionally grumble but will not take active measures to weaken the
United States or to hinder its efforts. By contrast, if they think that the United
States is insensitive, overweening, selfish, or simply misguided, then it will make
sense for them to do less to help the United States and to look for ways to limit
U.S. power and defeat American initiatives.
Unfortunately, there is considerable evidence to suggest that foreign elites do
not see the U.S. role in the world as favorably as most Americans do. According
to one recent survey, for example, only 18 percent of Americans thought that the
11 September attacks were caused by U.S. policies, but 58 percent of the foreign-
ers polled did. Similarly, 52 percent of all Americans believe that foreigners like
the United States because “it does a lot of good,” but only 21 percent of the for-
eigners polled share this view.32 Chinese officials habitually warn about the dan-
gers of U.S. “hegemonism”; countries like Iraq seek to portray the United States
as a heartless great power that is indifferent to the sufferings of others; and even
long-standing U.S. allies worry about the concentration of power in U.S. hands
and the unilateralist tendencies that it fosters.33
This means that the United States has a strong incentive for genuine multi-
lateral engagement, largely to convince others that it is not a selfish power bent
on exploiting its strength solely for its own benefit. From this perspective, the
Bush administration’s undiplomatic rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, of the veri-
fication protocol for the biological weapons convention, of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, of the international convention on land mines, and of the Inter-
national Criminal Court were all steps in the wrong direction. Whatever the
substantive merits of these various agreements, the United States pays a political
price in consistently standing apart from the prevailing global consensus. Unless
it is willing to abdicate an active leadership role in world affairs, the Bush team is
going to have to convince other states it is willing to compromise and to cooper-
ate on some important issues even when it does not get everything it wants. At
the very least, U.S. leaders must go beyond the mere appearance of listening and
demonstrate a genuine commitment to give-and-take with its principal allies.
Failure to do so will underscore the latent belief that the United States is a
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“rogue superpower” that does not deserve the mantle of global leadership,
making it more difficult to rally international support for initiatives that Wash-
ington wants to pursue.34
Does this really matter? According to some commentators, the United States
does not need to compromise with others, either because it is strong enough to
“go it alone” or because it can always compel their cooperation if it has to. It might
be pleasant for the United States if the world worked this way, but it doesn’t. The
United States needed help from other countries to go after Al-Qaeda and the
Taliban (and the job is not yet finished); it needs support from other states to
manage the world economy; and key U.S. efforts in the Middle East, Latin Amer-
ica, Asia, and elsewhere will depend on intelligence collaboration and diplo-
matic assistance. To put it bluntly, if the United States wants to exercise global
leadership, it cannot simply compel; it must also persuade—and sometimes it
will also need to compromise. Other states will be easier to convince if they see
U.S. leadership as serving their interests—at least some of the time—rather than
just its own.
Thus, the United States faces a clear choice. It can adopt a unilateral approach to
foreign policy and eschew multilateral cooperation except strictly on its own
terms. Such a policy may be tempting, because U.S. power allows it to bear the
short-term costs of a unilateralist policy. But an independent course would
make it nearly impossible for the United States to exercise the kind of influence
and leadership it has enjoyed for the past fifty years. Alternatively, the United
States can maintain a principled commitment to multilateralism, using its
power to ensure that most agreements are in the American interest. In other
words, it can be unilateralist and disengaged, or it can be multilateralist and fully
engaged. But trying to wield global leadership unilaterally is not going to work.
No country—not even the United States—is strong enough for that.
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